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Alfred  m  gray  marine  corps 

RES.EAR.Ch  O  N'TER 

ATTN  COLLECTION  MANAGEMENT 

(C40RCL) 

2040  BROADWAY  ST 
QUANTICOVA  22134-5107 


f  

the 

FIFTH  MARINE 


DIVISION 

Historical  Division 
U.  S.  Marine  Corps 


THE  FIFTH  MARINE  DIVISION 

in 

WORLD  WAR  II 


Prepared  by 
Lieutenant  John  C.  Chapin 
HISTORICAL  DIVISION 
HEADQUARTERS,  U.  S.  MARINE  CORPS 
August,  1945 


■it-  k*ro&" ' ' 

1/3,37 


MAY  -  d  $68 
JflST  ftcFERENCE  SEfl 


CHAPTER  I 

Formation  and  Training 


The  Fifth  Marine  Division  had  its  origin  in  a  letter  written  by  the  Commandant  of  the 
Marine  Corps  on  November  11,  1943.  This  letter  was  sent  to  the  Commanding  General  at 
Camp  Lejeune  and  to  the  Commanding  General,  Fleet  Marine  Force,  San  Diego  Area. 
It  stated  in  part:  "The  Fifth  Marine  Division  consisting  of  the  22nd  Marines  (Infantry), 
26th  Marines  (Infantry),  27th  Marines  (Infantry),  13th  Marines  (Artillery),  16th  Marines 
(Engineer),  and  Headquarters  and  Service  Troops,  will  be  organized  during  the  months 
of  December  1943,  and  January  and  February  1944."  It  was  intended  at  this  time  that 
Headquarters  and  Service  Troops  would  have  two  components:  Special  Troops  and  Service 
Troops.  The  former  was  to  contain  a  Special  Weapons  Battalion,  a  Headquarters  Battalion, 
and  a  Tank  Battalion.  The  latter  was  to  have  a  Service  Battalion,  a  Motor  Transport 
Battalion,  a  Medical  Battalion,  and  an  Amphibian  Tractor  Battalion.  The  Division's 
original  plan  of  organization  was  modified,  however.  Another  letter  from  the  Commandant 
on  January  20,  1944,  stated  that  the  22nd  Marines  would  not  become  part  of  the  Division, 
and  directed  that  the  28th  Marines  be  formed  instead. 

By  late  January,  the  activation  of  the  different  elements  of  the  Division  was  well 
under  way.  The  first  unit  had  been  Headquarters  Battalion,  which  was  formed  at  Camp 
Pendleton  on  December  1,  1943.  Then  the  16th  Marines*  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Clifford 
H.  Shuey,  USMC,  was  activated  on  December  15,  1943,  at  Camp  Lejeune.  On  January  10, 
1944,  several  regiments  were  organized  at  Camp  Pendleton:  the  13th  Marines**  (Colonel 
James  D.  Waller,  USMC),  the  26th  Marines  (Lieutenant  Colonel  Chester  B.  Graham, 
USMC),  and  the  27th  Marines  (Colonel  Thomas  A.  Wornham,  USMC).  The  Service  Troops 
were  constituted  as  an  entity  on  February  8,  1944,  under  Colonel  John  W.  Beckett,  USMC. 
This  new  unit  contained  not  only  the  Service  Battalion,  the  Medical  Battalion,  and  the 
Motor  Transport  Battalion,  but  also  the  Tank  Battalion  and  Headquarters  Battalion. 
(Thus  the  Amphibian  Tractor  Battalion,  the  Special  Weapons  Battalion,  and  "Special 
Troops"  were  eliminated  from  the  organic  make-up  of  the  Division.)  Also  activated  on 
February  8  was  the  28th  Marines  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Chandler  W.  Johnson,  USMC. 

During  the  period  February  3-6,  the  medical,  artillery,  and  engineer  units  that  had 
formed  and  trained  at  Camp  Lejeune  arrived  at  Camp  Pendleton.  The  Division  was  begin- 
ning to  take  shape  now,  and  on  January  21,  1944,  it  was  formally  activated  with  Brigadier 
General  Thomas  A.  Bourke,  USMC,  as  Acting  Commanding  General.***  On  February  4, 

*  A  16th  Provisional  Regiment  existed  from  May  11,  1920,  to  July  7,  1920,  during  which  time  it  made  one 
trip  to  Haiti. 

*»A  13th  Regiment  was  activated  on  July  3,  1918,  under  Lt.  Col.  Smedley  D.  Butler,  and  went  to  France, 
although  it  was  not  in  combat.  It  was  disbanded  August  15,  1919. 

***  This  date  is  taken  from  a  letter  of  the  Commanding  General,  5thMarDiv,  to  the  Commandant  on  1  Feb- 
ruary 1944.  For  a  complete  list  of  the  Division's  units  and  their  dates  of  activation,  see  Appendix  "B". 


-  1  - 


Major  General  Keller  E.  Rockey,  USMC,  assumed  command,  and  General  Bourke  became 
Assistant  Division  Commander.  By  the  end  of  February,  the  Division  contained  9478 
officers  and  men.  At  this  time,  the  Division  Staff  was  organized  as  follows:* 

Chief  of  Staff:  Colonel  William  A.  Worton 

D — 1:  Colonel  Lee  H.  Brown 

D — 2:  Lieutenant  Colonel  George  A.  Roll 

D — 3:  Lieutenant  Colonel  James  F.  Shaw 

D — 4:  Colonel  Randolph  McC.  Pate 

Now  that  most  of  the  units  of  the  Division  had  been  activated,  intensive  training  was 
begun.  This  training  was  well  organized  into  progressive  steps,  each  emphasizing  a  certain 
subject.  These  phases  were: 

"A" — February  8  to  March  12 — Basic  individual  training 

"B" — March  13  to  April  23 — Individual  and  small  unit  training 

"C" — April  24  to  May  14 — Company  tactical  training 

"D" — May  15  to  June  4 — Battalion  tactical  training 

"E" — June  5  to  June  11 — Regimental  tactical  training 

"F" — June  12  to  August  1 — Amphibious  training. 

The  early  periods  of  individual  and  unit  training  in  the  basic  essentials  of  combat 
were  followed  by  practice  in  the  technique  of  amphibious  operations.  Schools  were  held 
for  naval  gunfire,  medical,  communication,  transport  quartermaster,  and  staff  personnel. 
Meanwhile  the  troops  were  engaged  in  transport  training.  In  the  midst  of  all  these  activ- 
ities came  one  day  of  ceremony,  for  on  June  17  the  regimental  colors  were  presented  to 
each  of  the  regiments  of  the  Fifth  Division  at  a  sunset  parade.  By  the  end  of  June  the 
strength  of  the  Division  had  climbed  to  18,187  officers  and  men.** 

At  the  beginning  of  July,  the  scope  of  the  amphibious  training  widened,  and  plans 
were  made  for  landings  by  each  regimental  combat  team.  These  maneuvers  were  to  be 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Amphibious  Training  Command,  Pacific  Fleet.  The  troops 
of  CT  26  embarked  at  San  Diego  on  July  7.  From  there  they  went  to  San  Clemente  Island, 
where  two  landing  exercises  were  held.  Then  the  ships  moved  to  a  position  off  the  Cali- 
fornia coast,  and  CT  26  made  a  landing  with  the  mission  of  seizing  "Pendleton  Island." 
It  had  been  planned  to  continue  the  exercise  ashore  with  a  three  day  problem  lasting  until 
July  14.  On  the  twelfth,  however,  the  maneuvers  were  cancelled,  and  CT  26  returned  to 
camp.  All  hands  were  very  curious  about  the  cause  of  this  sudden  change.  The  answer 
was  not  long  in  coming:  the  26th  Marines  was  going  overseas.  The  senior  officers  were 
informed  that  a  dispatch  had  been  received  the  day  before  from  Headquarters,  Marine 
Corps,  ordering  the  Fifth  Division  to  send  one  reinforced  regiment  overseas  immediately. 
It  was  to  be  available  for  use  with  the  First  Marine  Division  Provisional  Brigade  in  the 
Guam  operation.  CT  26  had  been  chosen  for  this  assignment,  and  on  July  13  it  was 
redesignated  the  "26th  Marines,  Reinforced"  (with  the  usual  attached  engineer,  motor 
transport,  tank,  and  medical  units).  The  regiment  was  ordered  to  reduce  its  equipment 
to  a  minimum  and  then  to  move  to  San  Diego  and  combat  load  its  ships.  Only  July  22  the 
26th  Marines,  Reinforced,  was  detached  from  the  Fifth  Division  and  sailed  from  San  Diego 
to  report  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Ocean  Areas,  for  duty.  While  the  regiment 
was  en  route,  information  reaching  CINCPAC  indicated  that  the  Guam  operation  was 


*  Command  and  staff  personnel  are  chronologically  listed  in  Appendix  "A". 

**  For  a  tabulation  of  the  strength  of  the  Division  at  the  end  of  every  month,  see  Appendix  "D". 


-  2  - 


progressing  favorably  and  that  additional  forces  would  not  be  required  there.  Accordingly, 
CINCPAC  ordered  the  26th  Marines,  Reinforced,  to  proceed  to  Hilo,  Hawaii.  On  July  29 
the  regiment  arrived  there.  Further  orders  were  received  to  "execute  debarkation  with  a 
view  to  embarkation  for  combat."  This  was  done  and  the  regiment  began  moving  to  Camp 
Tarawa  at  Kamuela. 

Meanwhile,  back  at  Camp  Pendleton  the  remainder  of  the  Fifth  Division  continued 
its  training.  From  July  15  to  July  23,  CT  27  carried  out  landing  exercises  at  San  Clemente 
and  at  Aliso  Beach,  with  a  three  day  continuation  of  the  problem  ashore.  Immediately 
afterward,  CT  28  engaged  in  the  same  maneuvers,  and  upon  completion,  it  returned  to 
its  base  at  Tent  Camp  1. 

This  concluded  the  "stateside"  training  of  much  of  the  Division.  During  the  early 
part  of  August,  the  final  preparations  for  departure  were  made.  CT  28,  however,  was 
designated  part  of  the  Rear  Echelon  that  would  remain  at  Camp  Pendleton  after  the 
main  portion  of  the  Division  had  left.  On  August  12,  the  27th  Marines  (Reinforced),  the 
Rear  Echelon  of  the  26th  Marines,  and  the  Division  Control  Echelon  under  General  Rockey 
embarked  at  San  Diego  and  sailed  for  Hawaii.  The  convoy  arrived  at  Hilo  on  the  eighteenth, 
and  General  Rockey  reported  for  duty  to  the  Commanding  General,  FMF,  Pacific.  That 
same  day  the  Division  Command  Post  opened  at  Camp  Tarawa. 

Since  it  now  appeared  probable  that  the  Division  would  be  able  to  assemble  and  train 
as  a  unit  at  Hawaii,  the  regimental  combat  teams  were  broken  up.  Units  attached  to 
CT  26  and  CT  27  reverted  to  parent  organizational  control,  and  the  26th  Marines  (Rein- 
forced) became  the  26th  Marines,  Fifth  Marine  Division,  once  more.  A  Division  order  was 
Issued  setting  forth  a  master  training  schedule  for  all  units  at  Camp  Tarawa  to  follow. 

The  Rear  Echelon  was  also  engaged  in  intensive  training  in  field  problems  and  jungle 
fighting  at  this  time.  As  the  end  of  August  approached,  however,  it  too  began  to  get  ready 
for  embarkation.  VMO-5  was  the  first  unit  to  leave  (August  23).  During  September  the 
various  remaining  units  of  the  Division  departed  from  San  Diego  one  by  one:  the  last 
of  the  13th  Marines;  then  the  Forward  Echelon  of  the  28th  Marines;  then  the  H&S  Com- 
pany, the  Regimental  Weapons  Company,  and  the  Second  Battalion,  28th;  and  then  the 
First  Battalion,  28th.  By  October  11  the  final  units  of  the  28th  Marines  had  left  San  Diego, 
and  the  Command  Post  of  the  Rear  Echelon  was  closed  at  Camp  Pendleton  that  day.  The 
last  elements  of  the  Rear  Echelon  arrived  at  Hilo  on  October  19,  and  the  Fifth  Division 
was  finally  together  again  as  a  unit. 

Now  that  the  whole  Division  was  assembled  on  Hawaii,  training  and  planning  pro- 
ceeded apace.  On  October  18  two  officers  of  the  Division  Staff  attended  a  conference  at 
Pearl  Harbor.  Here  they  were  informed  that  an  assault  on  Iwcf  Jima  was  planned  and  that 
the  Fifth  Division  would  participate  in  it  as  part  of  the  V  Amphibious  Corps.  Upon  receipt 
of  this  information,  they  returned  to  Hawaii,  bringing  with  them  a  concept  of  the  forth- 
coming operation  prepared  by  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  tentative  scheme  of  maneuver 
drawn  up  by  Corps,  and  a  few  maps.  General  Rockey  then  held  a  conference  at  Camp 
Tarawa,  and  the  general  situation  was  explained  to  the  remainder  of  the  Division  Staff 
and  to  the  Regimental  Commanders.  The  Fifth  Division  was  formally  assigned  to  the 
V  Amphibious  Corps  on  October  20,  and  at  another  conference  that  day,  the  formulation 
of  the  Division's  operation  plan  was  begun.  For  reasons  of  security,  the  objective  was 
referred  to  only  as  "Island  X,"  and  all  identifying  features  were  eliminated  from  the 
maps  used.  Thus  a  wider  distribution  of  the  plan  to  the  lower  echelons  of  the  Division 
was  possible.  By  November  1,  the  Division's  preferred  operation  plan  had  been  completed 
and  flown  to  Pearl  Harbor. 


-  3  - 


Now  that  the  major  part  of  the  planning  had  been  done,  it  was  necessary  to  train 
the  assault  troops  in  the  projected  scheme  of  maneuver.  Moreover,  time  was  growing 
short,  for  word  had  been  received  on  October  24  that  loading  for  the  forthcoming  operation 
was  to  begin  on  December  2.  This  left  little  more  than  a  month  in  which  to  finish  training, 
but  the  Division  would  be  ready  in  time.  For  each  of  its  units,  upon  arriving  at  Hawaii, 
had  rapidly  been  fitted  into  the  Division's  overall  training  program.  Thus,  during  the 
first  half  of  October,  all  units  had  engaged  in  platoon  and  company  training,  and  in  the 
latter  half  of  the  month  they  had  conducted  landing  team  problems  (with  practice  in 
the  use  of  small  landing  craft,  air  support,  tanks,  etc.) 

With  the  completion  of  the  Division's  operation  plan  at  the  beginning  of  November, 
all  units  began  practicing  for  the  specific  role  they  were  to  play  in  the  attack  on  "Island 
X."  CT  28,  for  example,  maneuvered  in  terrain  similar  to  that  it  would  encounter  in  its 
assault  on  Mount  Suribachi. 

The  manifold  activities  of  the  Division  toward  the  end  of  its  stay  on  Hawaii  are  well 
described  in  the  Division's  War  Diary: 

"From  1-18  Nov.  the  Division  was  undergoing  Regimental  and  Combat  Team  tactical 
training,  emphasizing  planning  and  functioning  of  CT  and  LT  staffs,  with  special  stress 
on  the  planning  and  preparation  of  operation  orders,  conduct  of  the  Command  Post, 
cooperation  and  teamwork  between  staffs,  and  preparation  of  staff  records  and  reports. 
Functioning  of  supply  channels,  and  operation  and  coordination  of  all  communication 
agencies  was  exercised. 

"The  period  from  19  Nov.  to  the  end  of  the  month  was  spent  in  buttoning-up  for 
complete  readiness  for  combat.  Orders  were  issued  for  conduct  of  training  while  afloat, 
Combat  Teams  and  Support  Group  were  carefully  inspected  for  shortages  of  equipment, 
a  Division  CPX  was  held  emphasizing  use  of  communications  and  submission  of  periodic 
reports,  and  numerous  staff  conferences  were  called  relative  to  the  plans  of  the  forth- 
coming operation.  The  Division  was  entering  the  final  stages  of  its  training  prior  to 
loading  out  for  combat  operations  against  the  enemy." 

Dispatches  were  received  in  November  indicating  that  the  loading  date  was  to  be 
delayed.  The  last-minute  training  of  the  Division  was  continued,  therefore,  and  three 
final  Command  Post  exercises  were  held.  On  December  16,  VMO-5  left  for  Pearl  Harbor. 
By  now,  it  was  obvious  to  everyone  that  the  departure  date  was  at  hand.  All  combat 
equipment  had  been  crated  and  marked  for  shipment,  final  inspection  of  gear  had  been 
made,  tetanus  shots  had  b%en  given,  field  training  had  tapered  off,  and  all  hands  were 
ready  to  go.  The  movement  of  equipment  and  supplies  to  the  piers  at  Hilo  and  to  the  LST 
beach  began  on  December  20.  Christmas  Day  was  a  holiday  and  was  appropriately  cele- 
brated. This  same  day  the  loading  of  cargo  aboard  ship  got  underway.  For  the  next  two 
weeks  the  supplies  and  personnel  of  the  Division  left  Kamuela  in  a  steady  stream  and 
moved  to  Hilo  for  embarkation.  By  January  9,  the  last  unit  (CT  28)  of  the  Combat  Echelon 
had  sailed  for  Pearl  Harbor,  and  only  the  Base  Echelon  remained  at  Camp  Tarawa. 

As  each  unit  arrived  at  Pearl  Harbor,  a  liberty  schedule  was  set  up  so  that  25%  of  the  . 
men  could  go  ashore  each  day.  This  pleasant  life  did  not  last  long,  however,  for  on  January 
12  the  whole  Division  left  Pearl  Harbor  for  maneuvers.  These  were  conducted  at  Maalaea 
Bay  (Maui)  and  at  Kahoolawe,  and  included  rehearsals  of  the  ship-to-shore  movement  as 
well  as  a  full-scale  landing  and  overnight  problem.  This  was  the  first  time  that  the 


-  4  - 


Division  had  worked  as  a  part  of  a  corps,  and  thus  a  great  deal  of  valuable  experience 
was  gained.  Furthermore,  since  the  maneuvers  were  designed  as  a  rehearsal  for  the  Iwo 
Jima  landing,  they  gave  additional  practice  in  the  execution  of  the  Division's  operation 
plan. 

On  January  18,  all  units  returned  to  Pearl  Harbor  for  a  final  period  of  rehabilitation. 
Once  again  liberty  was  granted  to  a  certain  portion  of  the  men  each  day.  Senior  officers 
and  their  staffs  held  conferences  and  critiques.  On  January  22  the  LST  and  LSM  flotilla, 
bearing  the  13th  Marines,  11th  Amphibian  Tractor  Battalion,  5th  Tank  Battalion,  and  the 
5th  Shore  Party  Regiment,  departed  from  Pearl  Harbor.  Five  days  later,  the  main  part  of 
the  Fifth  Division  left,  bound  for  its  first  combat. 


-  5  - 


CHAPTER  II 
Iwo  Jima 


Once  the  convoy  was  underway,  the  word  was  passed  to  all  hands  that  the  Division  was 
bound  for  Iwo  Jima.  Classes  began  right  away,  so  that  everyone  would  receive  all  available 
information  about  the  objective  and  the  plan  of  attack.  The  island  of  Iwo  Jima,  a  member 
of  the  Volcano  group,  was  situated  only  660  miles  from  Tokyo  and  625  miles  from  Saipan. 
Pearl  Harbor,  on  the  other  hand,  was  3330  miles  away.  (See  map  of  "Pacific  Ocean  Areas.") 
The  importance  of  Iwo  lay  in  its  strategic  location,  for  it  guarded  the  home  islands  of 
Japan,  and  from  its  airfields  rose  the  Jap  interceptor  planes  that  harassed  America's 
B-29'S. 

The  United  States  had  marshalled  and  coordinated  a  great  many  units  in  order  to 
prepare  for  the  landing  on  Iwo.  Planes  from  the  20th  Air  Force  and  the  Fast  Carrier  Force 
had  hit  the  mainland  of  Japan  to  prevent  any  surface  or  air  support  from  reaching  the 
enemy  on  Iwo.  American  submarines  had  been  active  in  blockading  the  objective.  The 
Strategic  Air  Force,  Pacific  Ocean  Areas,  had  been  making  strikes  against  Iwo  itself  for 
several  months.  In  direct  support,  Task  Force  52  and  Task  Force  54  made  the  pre-invasion 
bombardments  and  air  strikes,  while  the  minesweepers  and  underwater  demolition  teams 
cleared  the  way  for  the  assault  forces.  Simultaneously,  the  planes  of  Task  Force  58  were 
over  Honshu  in  force. 

The  chain  of  command  of  the  invasion  troops  was  organized  as  follows: 
Fifth  Fleet  (TF  50)— Admiral  R.  A.  Spruance,  USN. 
Joint  Expeditionary  Troops  (TF  51) — Vice  Admiral  R.  K.  Turner,  USN. 
Expeditionary  Troops  (TF  56) — Lieutenant  General  H.  M.  Smith,  USMC. 
Landing  Force  (TG  56.1)— Major  General  Harry  Schmidt,  USMC. 

The  Landing  Force  was  built  around  the  V  Amphibious  Corps  which  contained  two 
assault  divisions,  the  Fifth  Marine  Division  (Major  General  Keller  E.  Rockey,  USMC),  and 
the  Fourth  Marine  Division  (Major  General  Clifton  B.  Cates,  USMC).  The  Third  Marine 
Division  (Major  General  Graves  B.  Erskine,  USMC)  formed  the  Expeditionary  Troops 
Reserve.  The  operation  plan  called  for  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Divisions  to  land  abreast 
(with  the  Fifth  on  the  left)  on  D-day  on  the  southeast  beaches  of  Iwo.  D-day  had  been 
set  for  February  19,  1945,  after  being  postponed  from  January  20.  Units  attached  for  this 
landing  brought  the  strength  of  the  Fifth  Division  (Reinforced)  up  to  24,797  officers 
and  men.* 

Aboard  ship,  the  men  of  the  Division  were  studying  maps,  aerial  photographs,  and 
relief  models  of  the  objective.  Classes  were  held  daily,  and  the  plan  of  attack  was  ex- 
*  Headquarters,  Expeditionary  Troops,  G-l  Report  on  Iwo. 


-  7  - 


plained  in  detail  to  everyone.  The  Fifth  Division  was  to  land  on  beaches  Green  1,  Red  1, 
and  Red  2.  The  assault  battalions  in  their  LVT's  would  be  preceded  by  a  wave  of  LVT(A)'s. 
CT  27  and  CT  28  (each  reinforced  with  engineers  and  other  special  troops)  were  to  be 
abreast  with  the  27th  Marines  on  the  right.  Advancing  inland  as  rapidly  as  possible,  these 
two  regiments  would  attempt  to  drive  across  the  island  to  the  western  beaches.  There 
they  would  wheel,  and  the  27th  Marines  would  move  northward,  while  the  28th  would 
attack  to  the  south  against  Mount  Suribachi.  Following  the  infantry  units  would  come  the 
regimental  weapons  and  tanks.  A  total  of  approximately  4500  men  and  their  equipment' 
would  be  ashore  within  45  minutes.  The  Division  Reserve  (consisting  of  LT  3/28  and  LT 
1/26)  and  the  Division  Artillery  (the  13th  Marines)  were  to  land  on  call.  CT  26  minus 
LT  1/26  was  to  be  in  Corps  Reserve.* 

As  these  plans  were  being  explained  to  everyone,  the  convoy  moved  westward.  On 
February  5  the  Division  arrived  at  Eniwetok  and  a  staff  conference  was  held  there.  The 
convoy  departed  on  February  7,  and  on  the  11th  it  arrived  at  Saipan.  Two  days  later, 
a  final  rehearsal  was  conducted  with  a  simulated  landing  on  the  west  coast  of  Tinian. 
After  one  last  conference,  at  which  the  latest  intelligence  data  was  distributed,  the 
Division  left  for  Iwo  Jima  on  February  16. 

Tension  began  to  mount  now.  This  was  the  Fifth  Division's  first  combat  assignment, 
and  everyone  was  keyed  up  as  the  convoy  approached  the  objective.  However,  about  40% 
of  the  men  in  the  Division  had  been  in  battle  before  (in  the  old  Raider  Battalions  and 
other  units),  so  there  was  a  valuable  stabilizing  element  of  experienced  Marines. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  February  19,  the  convoy  arrived  in  the  transport  area.  It  was 
D-day  and  Iwo  Jima  lay  ahead.  By  0744  the  first  LVT's  began  disembarking.  H-hour  was 
set  for  0900.  On  every  side,  the  supporting  ships  of  the  Navy  were  pouring  their  fire  onto 
the  island.  Planes  were  making  run  after  run  on  their  targets,  bombing,  rocketing,  and 
strafing.  At  0825,  the  first  wave  crossed  the  Line  of  Departure.  LCI's  firing  mortars  and 
LCS's  using  rockets  were  in  direct  support.**  The  landing  beaches  were  saturated  with 
high  explosives  as  the  assault  troops  went  in.  The  first  wave  hit  the  beaches  between 
0859  and  0903.  The  enemy  was  still  stunned  by  the  pre-H  hour  barrage,  and  only  moderate 
fire  was  received.  "Upon  landing,  it  became  apparent  that  the  enemy  had  not  chosen  to 
defend  the  beaches  at  the  landing  areas.  Accordingly,  speed  of  the  attack  was  emphasized, 
and  the  attack  was  pushed  rapidly  across  the  island  to  the  cliff  lines  controlling  the  west 
coast."***  Advancing  inland,  the  assault  battalions  from  right  to  left  were  1/27,  2/27,  and 
1/28.  As  LT  1/28  moved  westward,  2/28  landed  (at  0956)  and  deployed  facing  Mount 
Suribachi  to  cover  the  open  left  flank.  Enemy  artillery  and  mortar  fire  increased  steadily 
in  its  intensity.  Its  pin-point  accuracy  never  varied,  however,  for  the  high  ground  on 
both  sides  of  the  corps'  zone  was  dotted  with  Jap  observation  posts. 

While  the  infantry  was  fighting  its  way  inland,  the  supporting  arms  were  having 
trouble  back  on  the  beach.  The  loose  black  volcanic  sand  was  bogging  down  the  wheeled 
vehicles,  the  surf  was  causing  a  considerable  number  of  landing  craft  to  broach,  the  steep 
terraces  were  blocking  egress  from  the  beaches,  Jap  artillery  and  mortar  fire  was  blanket- 
ing the  beach  area,  and  extensive  mine  fields  were  taking  a  heavy  toll.  In  spite  of  all  these 
difficulties,  reserves  continued  to  pour  ashore.  Tanks  were  coming  in  by  0930,  LT  3/28 
was  on  Green  1  by  1215,  and  LT  1/26  was  ashore  by  1445.  The  rest  of  CT  26  was  soon 
released  to  the  Fifth  Division  by  Corps,  and  it  had  been  landed  by  1732.  During  the  after- 
*  For  the  Task  Organization  of  the  Fifth  Division  at  Iwo,  see  Appendix  "C". 

**  Speaking  of  this  naval  fire,  the  5th  Division  Action  Report  says  (P.17) :  "These  fires  made  it  possible  for 
the  assault  waves  to  land." 

***  5th  Division  Action  Report,  P.17. 


-  8  - 


noon,  the  artillery  of  the  13th  Marines,  the  remainder  of  the  5th  Tank  Battalion,  the 
Shore  and  Beach  Parties,  and  the  Division  Advance  Command  Post  all  came  ashore  and 
began  operations. 

Thus  by  the  end  of  D-day,  all  the  main  elements  of  the  Fifth  Division  were  ashore. 
The  assault  regiments,  after  splitting  the  island  in  two,  were  driving  north  and  south 
in  the  face  of  bitter  opposition.  The  Jap  defenders  were  hidden  deep  in  countless  emplace- 
ments, caves,  and  pillboxes,  all  of  which  were  mutually  supporting.  Every  foot  of  the 
Marine  advance  was  into  the  teeth  of  this  defense-in-depth  with  its  bands  of  interlocking 
fire.  In  one  day,  therefore,  the  Fifth  Division  suffered  904  casualties.*  Three  hundred 
sixty-six  enemy  dead  had  already  been  counted,*  however,  and  a  beachhead  1000  yards 
deep  and  1500  yards  wide  had  been  seized.  (See  map  of  "Iwo  Jima.") 

After  the  heavy  fighting  during  the  day,  the  hours  of  darkness  were  needed  for  rest 
and  reorganization.  The  enemy  had  other  plans.  In  the  words  of  the  Division's  official 
report:  "The  night  of  D-day  was  active  with  numerous  infiltration  attempts,  an  attempted 
counterattack  in  strength,  and  heavy  shelling  of  our  lines  and  rear  areas." 

When  morning  came  on  D  plus  1  (February  20),  the  Division's  two-pronged  attack 
was  resumed.  CT  28  drove  southward  against  the  Suribachi  defenses,  while  CT  27  advanced 
northward  along  the  west  coast  of  the  island.  CT  26  remained  in  Division  Reserve.  The 
attack  against  Mt.  Suribachi  was  made  with  LT  2/28  on  the  left  and  LT  3/28  on  the  right. 
LT  1/28  was  in  reserve  initially.  The  regiment  was  met  by  intense  fire  from  pillboxes  and 
emplacements  at  the  base  of  the  mountain  and  from  caves  dug  into  the  cliffs.  Every  move 
the  Marines  made  was  under  direct  observation  of  the  enemy  on  top  of  Suribachi.  It  was 
a  yard  by  yard  advance  with  all  supporting  weapons  brought  into  play  where  possible. 
When  they  could  not  be  used,  squads  and  platoons,  using  flame  throwers  and  demolitions, 
did  the  job  alone.  Progress  was  slow  and  bloody.  At  the  end  of  the  day  only  minor  gains 
had  been  made  by  the  28th  Marines. 

On  the  Division's  other  front,  CT  27  was  able  to  make  better  progress.  LT  1/26  was 
attached  to  it  and  was  used  as  the  left  assault  battalion,  with  LT  3/27  on  the  right.  Tanks 
spearheaded  the  advance.  Although  enemy  opposition  was  heavy,  the  portion  of  Airfield 
No.  1  that  lay  in  the  Division's  zone  was  taken,  and  an  advance  of  about  800  yards  was 
made. 

Back  on  the  beaches,  heavy  artillery  and  mortar  fire  was  being  received  constantly. 
Casualties  kept  on  mounting.  The  flow  of  ample  supplies  ashore  and  up  to  the  assault 
troops  was  still  obstructed.  The  beachline  was  littered  with  broached  landing  craft.  The 
loose  sand  continued  to  pose  a  problem;  Green  1  was  impassable  except  for  LVT's.  Yet 
somehow  the  Shore  and  Beach  Parties  "delivered  the  goods."** 

On  the  following  day,  D  plus  2  (February  21),  CT  28  resumed  its  drive  on  Suribachi. 
Once  again,  progress  was  slow  in  the  face  of  fanatical  resistance.  Concealed  Jap  positions 
had  to  be  taken  in  hand  to  hand  combat.  By  nightfall,  the  28th  had  reached  the  base  of 
the  mountain  and  there  it  dug  in. 

Meanwhile,  CT  27  was  also  meeting  heavy  enemy  resistance.  Casualties  were  heavy, 
especially  in  LT  1/26.  However,  with  the  help  of  tanks,  an  advance  of  900-1000  yards  was 

*  These  figures,  and  all  succeeding  casualty  totals,  are  taken  from  Annex  "A"  of  the  5th  Division  Action 
Report  on  Iwo,  and  from  the  Division's  War  Diary. 

**  It  will  not  be  possible  in  an  account  of  this  size  to  mention  the  role  of  all  the  elements  of  the  Division. 
Such  groups  as  the  aerial  observers,  the  medical  personnel,  the  communicators,  the  engineers,  the  naval 
gunfire  and  air  liaison  parties,  the  Seabees,  and  many  other  all  contributed  a  great  deal  to  the  final  victory 
of  the  Division. 


-  9  - 


achieved  during  the  morning,  and  the  O-l  line  was  nearly  reached.  (See  map.)  Here  the 
regiment  was  stopped  by  intense  fire  from  enemy  mortars  and  artillery.  Moreover,  a  large 
gap  had  developed  between  the  Fifth  Division's  right  flank  and  the  Fourth  Division. 
LT  1/27  was  committed  to  fill  the  space.  It  had  to  extend  its  lines  400  yards  into  the  zone 
of  the  Fourth  Division  before  the  gap  was  closed. 

This  same  afternoon  (D  plus  2),  General  Rockey  and  the  Division  Staff  landed,  and 
the  Division  CP  was  opened  ashore  (1330).  Conditions  in  the  beach  areas  were  improving 
now.  Matting  and  bulldozers  were  speeding  the  clearance  of  supplies,  and  enemy  fire  had 
diminished.  Nevertheless,  by  nightfall  the  Fifth  Division's  casualty  total  stood  at  2057. 

During  the  night,  the  entire  northern  flank  of  the  Division  was  hit  by  a  series  of  Jap 
counterattacks  that  lasted  from  2100  until  day-break.  The  men  of  the  27th  Marines 
repulsed  all  attempts  at  a  breakthrough  and  maintained  their  lines  intact. 

With  the  coming  of  day  on  D  plus  3  (February  22),  CT  26  passed  through  the  27th 
Marines,  and  jumped  off  in  the  attack  with  its  three  battalions  abreast.  Enemy  fire  from 
the  right  flank  slowed  the  regiment's  progress,  and  permission  was  obtained  to  direct 
its  assault  into  the  Fourth  Division's  zone  in  order  to  silence  the  enemy  weapons  there. 
Several  hundred  yards  were  gained,  but  when  the  units  adjacent  to  its  right  flank  failed 
to  keep  abreast,  the  26th  was  once  again  subjected  to  enfilade  fire,  and  it  was  forced 
to  withdraw  to  its  original  position. 

Meanwhile,  CT  28  in  the  south  was  working  its  way  around  the  base  of  Mt.  Suribachi. 
Because  of  the  nature  of  the  terrain,  it  was  not  feasible  to  use  support  fires  to  any  great 
extent.  Thus  the  fighting  resolved  itself  once  more  into  a  direct  assault  on  enemy  forti- 
fications by  small  units  of  Marine  riflemen.  Simultaneously,  patrols  were  reconnoitering 
the  area  in  search  of  a  route  up  to  the  top  of  the  mountain.  They  were  unable  to  locate 
any  usable  path,  but  at  the  end  of  the  day  (D  plus  3),  Suribachi  had  been  surrounded 
except  for  a  400  yard  gap  on  the  west  coast. 

The  following  morning  a  patrol  from  Company  E  of  the  28th  Marines  did  discover 
a  path  up  the  mountain  which  they  were  able  to  ascend,  and  at  1037  that  morning  of 
D  plus  4  (February  23)  the  American  flag  was  hoisted  on  top  of  Mt.  Suribachi.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  mountain  was  soon  surrounded  and  mopping  up  began. 

In  the  northern  sector,  CT  26  (with  LT  2/27  still  attached)  continued  its  efforts  to 
batter  its  way  through  the  wall  of  fire  that  faced  it.  No  progress  was  made,  however,  and 
by  now  (D  plus  4),  the  Division  had  lost  2926  officers  and  men.  A  total  of  1628  enemy  dead 
had  been  counted  and  four  prisoners  had  been  taken. 

To  give  additional  support  to  CT  26,  an  extremely  heavy  preparation  was  laid  down 
the  next  day,  D  plus  5  (February  24),  by  artillery,  naval  gunfire,  and  planes.  In  an  attempt 
to  knock  out  the  enemy  positions  beyond  Airfield  No.  1  that  had  been  holding  up  the 
advance,  the  tanks  of  all  three  Marine  divisions  were  concentrated  for  a  coordinated  drive 
on  that  area.  With  this  spearhead,  CT  21  in  the  Fourth  Division  zone  was  able  to  come 
up  abreast  of  CT  26  by  noon.  Then  another  barrage  began;  all  available  Marine  artillery 
was  massed  on  the  same  targets.  (In  addition,  planes,  rockets,  and  naval  gunfire  joined 
in  the  preparation.)  Under  cover  of  this,  CT  26  drove  slowly  forward,  still  under  heavy  fire 
from  Japs  deeply  entrenched  in  cave  positions  on  the  right  flank.  After  such  a  heavy 
shelling,  the  continuation  of  Japanese  resistance  almost  undiminished  showed  the  skill 
with  which  the  enemy's  defenses  had  been  prepared.  His  pillboxes  were  dug  deep  into 
the  ground,  often  with  several  levels  and  interconnecting  tunnels.  When  a  Marine  barrage 
fell  on  an  enemy  position,  the  Jap  defenders  merely  retired  to  the  depths  of  their  emplace- 


-  10  - 


ment  and  waited  out  the  storm.  Then  they  remanned  their  weapons,  and  when  the  Marines 
advanced,  the  Japs  poured  out  a  hail  of  fire.  If  one  position  was  assaulted,  the  enemy 
would  move  to  another  on  the  flank  and  open  up  with  deadly  surprise  fire  from  there. 

In  spite  of  this  unyielding  resistance  of  the  enemy's,  CT  26  managed  to  claw  out  a 
gain  of  500  yards  on  this  day  of  D  plus  5,  February  24.  (See  map.)  The  massed  artillery 
fires  were  proving  their  value,  and  their  accuracy  had  been  greatly  increased  now  by 
observation  posts  that  had  been  set  up  on  newly  won  Mt.  Suribachi.  This  area  on  and 
around  the  mountain  was  still  being  mopped  up  by  CT  28.  Over  1000  enemy  fortifications 
and  600  Jap  dead  had  been  counted  there,  with  another  200-300  of  the  enemy  still  active. 
(For  instance,  122  Japs  were  killed  by  the  28th  Marines  as  they  attempted  to  infiltrate 
into  the  artillery  positions  very  early  in  the  morning  of  D  plus  5.) 

The  next  day  was  a  quiet  one  for  the  Division.  CT  26  remained  in  position  waiting 
for  the  unit  on  its  right  flank  to  draw  abreast.  CT  27  was  in  Division  Reserve  now,  while 
CT  28  had  been  placed  in  Corps  Reserve. 

On  D  plus  7  (February  26)  after  the  usual  preparatory  barrage,  the  26th  Marines 
jumped  off  in  the  attack  again.  The  terrain  was  generally  unsuitable  for  tanks,  although 
flame-thrower  tanks  were  used  with  good  results  against  some  Japanese  cave  positions. 
Throughout  the  day,  heavy  artillery  and  mortar  fire  was  received  from  the  enemy  on  the 
high  ground  to  the  north.  Counter-battery  fire,  using  HE,  time  fire,  and  white  phosphorous 
simultaneously,  was  successful  in  knocking  out  several  of  the  Jap  guns.  By  nightfall,  the 
center  units  of  CT  26  had  advanced  500  yards  ahead  of  the  flank  elements,  so  that  the 
regimental  line  was  echeloned  to  the  rear  on  both  sides.  The  Division's  casualties  had 
mounted  by  now  (D  plus  7)  to  3518.  Japanese  losses  to  the  Fifth  Division  totaled  2663 
dead  and  5  prisoners. 

During  the  night,  several  hundred  of  the  enemy  were  observed  assembling  near  Hill 
362A,  but  they  were  dispersed  by  a  concentration  of  artillery  fire.*  At  0630,  CT  27  (with 
LT  1/26  attached)  relieved  the  26th  Marines  in  the  line  and  resumed  the  attack  with 
three  battalions  abreast.  Progress  was  slow  in  face  of  fierce  resistance,  mutually-supporting 
caves  and  pillboxes,  bad  terrain  and  mines  that  hampered  tanks,  and  heavy  Jap  mortar 
fire. 

In  the  rear  areas,  things  had  improved  considerably.  The  beaches  and  roads  were 
now  able  to  handle  wheeled  traffic,  and  supplies  were  moving  up  steadily.  Snipers  were 
being  eliminated.  (To  date,  515  by-passed  Japs  had  been  killed  by  patrols  behind  the  lines.) 
The  reconstruction  of  Airfield  No.  1  was  under  way,  and  during  the  afternoon  (D  plus  8, 
February  27),  the  first  plane  of  VMO-5  landed  on  it. 

When  CT  27  began  its  assault  on  D  plus  9,  it  was  spearheaded  by  tanks,  but  it  ran  into 
a  hornet's  nest.  "The  attack  of  CT  27  was  made  against  the  backbone  of  the  western  flank 
of  the  enemy  cross-island  defensive  position  .  .  .  These  emplacements  consisted  of  caves, 
reinforced  concrete  pillboxes,  and  blockhouses  emplaced  in  vertical  cliffs  around  the  base 
of  jagged  rocky  outcrops  where  excellent  fields  of  fire  commanded  the  all  around  ap- 
proaches. The  enemy  put  up  a  bitter  defense  making  no  withdrawal  but  leaving  each  man 
to  be  exterminated  in  his  position  or  to  be  by-passed  and  converted  into  a  sniper.  In  this 
area  a  much  greater  use  was  made  of  small  arms  than  in  any  other  position  previously 

*  There  were  two  hills  named  "362"  in  the  zone  of  the  Fifth  Division.  For  purposes  of  clarity,  the  first  one 
(in  TA  216R)  will  be  called  "362A",  and  the  more  northernly  one  (in  TA  235U)  will  be  called  "362B". 


-  11  - 


encountered.  Firing  from  close  ranges,  sniper  fire  was  extremely  effective  and  our  casual- 
ties among  leaders  of  companies,  platoons,  and  squads  was  heavy."* 

The  keystone  in  this  defense  line  was  Hill  362A.  (See  map.)  The  assault  on  it  began 
about  noon  and  ground  slowly  ahead  through  the  maze  of  Jap  fortifications.  At  1545  the 
enemy  counterattacked  and  was  repulsed,  although  Marine  losses  were  heavy.  CT  27  was 
on  the  hill  by  1700,  but  the  Japs  were  still  well  dug  in  on  the  reverse  slopes. 

The  night  (D  plus  9-10,  February  28-March  1),  the  rear  areas  of  the  Division  received 
a  heavy  shelling,  and  the  Division  ammunition  dump  was  hit.  The  fire  that  resulted 
produced  a  spectacular  pyrotechnic  display  and  caused  the  loss  of  25%  of  the  Division's 
munitions  before  it  was  brought  under  control. 

To  complete  the  reduction  of  Hill  362A,  a  fresh  regiment  was  committed  the  following 
morning.  CT  28,  which  had  been  mopping  up  the  Suribachi  area  while  in  Corps  Reserve, 
was  brought  up  to  relieve  the  weary  27th  Marines." With  LT  3/26  attached,  CT  28  began 
its  assault.  By  1100  LT  1/28  had  secured  the  stubborn  hill,  and  then  it  began  blowing  shut 
the  multitudinous  caves  there  and  mopping  up  the  area.  Good  progress  was  made  on  both 
flanks  by  the  other  battalions,  and  it  was  necessary  to  commit  LT  3/26  to  fill  a  gap  that 
opened  up  on  the  right  flank.  The  fierce  fighting  for  Hill  362A  had  raised  the  Division's 
casualties  to  4283,  while  Japanese  losses  in  the  Fifth  Division  zone  now  came  to  3252  dead 
and  12  prisoners  on  D  plus  10. 

With  one  natural  obstacle  taken,  the  Fifth  Division  was  immediately  faced  with  a 
new  one.  Ahead  of  it  loomed  Nishi  Ridge.  (See  map.)  Another  difficulty  that  arose  now 
was  the  increasing  width  of  the  Division's  front.  The  Third  Division  on  the  right  had 
shifted  the  direction  of  its  attack  to  the  east,  and  as  a  result  it  became  necessary  for 
the  Fifth  Division  to  put  additional  battalions  in  the  line.  Accordingly,  LT  1/26  and 
LT  2/26  were  moved  into  the  gap  on  the  right  flank  (D  plus  11,  March  2).  Thus  all  three 
landing  teams  of  CT  26  were  now  in  action  on  the  right  of  the  28th  Marines. 

With  these  two  regiments  abreast,  the  Fifth  Division  pounded  steadily  against  the 
enemy's  defenses.  On  D  plus  11  the  ruins  of  the  village  of  Nishi  were  overrun,  and  a  Jap 
counterattack  on  the  right  flank  was  thrown  back.  The  next  objective  was  Hill  362B, 
which  commanded  all  the  surrounding  area.  (See  map.)  The  terrain  here  was  extremely 
rough  and  actually  presented  as  much  of  an  obstacle  as  the  Japs  did.  In  addition,  the 
enemy  was  defending  Hill  362B  with  extremely  heavy  Are.  All  of  its  approaches  were 
mined,  and  armored  bulldozers  were  used  to  clear  routes  and  make  new  roads,  so  that 
tanks  could  be  brought  up  in  close  support.  CT  26  then  moved  in,  and  after  savage  hand- 
to-hand  fighting  it  finally  secured  the  hill  on  D  plus  12  (March  3). 

That  night  the  Japs  made  a  determined  attempt  to  infiltrate  the  lines  of  CT  26. 
They  failed  and  97  of  them  were  killed.  The  next  day  two  successive  groups  of  the  enemy, 
each  200-300  strong,  were  seen  forming  up  for  an  effort  to  retake  Hill  362B.  Mortar  and 
artillery  fire  were  placed  on  them  and  they  were  dispersed.  The  Division  made  no  material 
gains  this  day  of  D  plus  13,  and  by  now  its  losses  had  reached  5511.  Jap  dead,  however, 
totaled  4790  (plus  19  prisoners)  in  the  Fifth  Division  zone  alone. 

After  the  long,  grueling  days  of  steady  fighting  and  sudden  death,  with  little  sleep 
and  hasty  meals,  the  men  of  the  assault  battalions  were  nearing  complete  exhaustion. 
A  day  for  rest  and  reorganization  was  ordered,  therefore,  on  D  plus  14  (March  5).  Prepara- 
tions were  also  made  for  the  continuation  of  the  attack  the  next  day. 

An  intensive  preparatory  barrage  was  laid  down  the  following  morning  (D  plus  15) 
by  all  supporting  arms,  with  the  13th  Marines  alone  firing  6200  rounds.  At  0800,  the 

*  5th  Division  Action  Report,  P.  23. 


-  12  - 


Division  jumped  off  with  ail  three  regiments  abreast.  The  "assault  was  bitterly  contested, 
by  the  Japs  from  prepared  bunkers,  pillboxes,  and  caves.  Heavy  rifle,  machine  gun,  mortar 
fire,  and  white  phosphorous  shells  poured  into  our  troops  attempting  to  advance  from 
Hill  362  B  to  the  north.  The  jagged  rocks  and  broken  country  made  close  tank  support  im- 
possible and  greatly  reduced  the  effectiveness  of  our  artillery.  It  was  once  again  a  battle 
of  Marine  against  Jap,  with  the  Jap  having  all  the  advantages  of  cover,  concealment,  and 
fields  of  fire  from  prepared  positions.  Most  of  the  heavy  caliber  enemy  weapons  to  our 
front  had  been  destroyed  but  the  division  was  receiving  sporadic  heavy  caliber  fire  from 
the  northeast  part  of  the  island.  A  gain  of  50  to  100  yards  was  made  along  the  fronts  of 
CT's  27  and  26  on  the  right  and  in  the  center  of  our  zone  of  action.  No  material  gain  was 
made  by  CT  28  on  the  left.  However,  more  progress  was  made  than  could  be  measured  in 
yards  as  numerous  enemy  installations  were  destroyed  or  neutralized."* 

The  continued  pressure  on  the  enemy  slowly  began  to  bring  results.  On  D  plus  16 
(March  7),  the  28th  Marines  made  substantial  gains.  By-passing  many  cave  positions,  it 
advanced  500  yards  and  seized  Hill  215.  (See  map.)  On  the  right  flank  CT  27  made  only 
limited  progress,  although  LT  2/27,  after  grenade  duels  and  hand-to-hand  fighting,  did 
reach  a  position  within  sight  of  the  shore  line  on  the  northeast  coast  of  the  island.  The 
Division  had  lost  6043  officers  and  men  so  far  (D  plus  16),  but  the  enemy  had  had  6489 
killed  by  the  Fifth  Division. 

To  check  the  enemy's  constant  attempts  at  infiltration  during  the  night,  trip  flares 
were  set  out,  and  they  proved  very  effective  in  silhouetting  Japs  who  approached  the 
Marines  lines  under  cover  of  darkness.  On  the  night  of  D  plus  16-17,  for  example,  LT  1/26 
repulsed  an  enemy  patrol  which  had  set  off  flares  revealing  its  position. 

When  morning  came,  the  Division  began  its  attack  once  more.  All  three  regiments 
were  still  abreast,  with  the  main  effort  being  made  on  the  right  by  CT  27.  The  objective 
was  a  concentration  of  interconnecting  caves  and  tunnels.  The  whole  area  was  heavily 
mined,  and  the  reverse  sides  of  the  rocky  ledges  were  as  strongly  fortified  as  the  forward 
slopes.  In  terrain  of  this  nature,  advances  were  painfully  slow.  It  was  the  old  familiar 
problem  of  assaulting  each  cave  and  pillbox  individually,  while  being  hit  by  flanking  fire 
from  a  foe  that  was  always  unseen.  One  regiment  estimated  that  it  by-passed  as  many 
Japs  as  it  killed.  Supporting  arms  were  severely  handicapped  by  the  rough  ground,  and 
the  Division  moved  ahead  only  after  each  close-in  fight  had  been  won  by  small  groups  of 
riflemen  using  grenades  and  flamethrowers.**  Finally,  on  D  plus  18  (March  9),  the  strong- 
point  was  taken  and  mopping  up  of  the  area  began.  The  Division  had  now  suffered  6544 
casualties,  while  7605  of  the  enemy  had  been  killed. 

When  the  attack  was  continued  the  next  day,  two  new  terrain  features  rapidly  came 
to  the  attention  of  the  Division.  Across  its  front  for  700  yards  ran  a  deep  gorge,  and  beyond 
that  lay  a  high  ridge  that  extended  southeast  from  Kitano  Point.  Heavy  enemy  fire  was 
being  received  from  both  these  areas.  On  D  plus  20  (March  11),  therefore,  an  intense 
preparation  was  fired  with  12  battalions  of  artillery  pouring  down  10,000  rounds  in  front 
of  the  Fifth  Division.  Behind  this  barrage,  CT  27  and  CT  28  began  their  attack.  The 
fighting  was  at  such  close  ranges  that  it  was  impossible  to  use  further  artillery  or  air 
support.  All  entrances  to  the  gorge  were  thoroughly  covered  by  enemy  fire.  Concealed  Jap 
emplacements  were  opening  fire  at  point  blank  range.***  Nevertheless,  CT  28  fought  its 

*  5th  Division  Action  Report,  P.  25. 

**RCT  27,  however,  had  a  75mm  pack  howitzer  moved  up  to  its  front  lines  on  D  plus  17  in  order  to  bring 
direct  fire  to  bear  on  the  caves  and  pillboxes  that  were  holding  up  its  advance. 

***  As  a  result,  this  piece  of  ground  soon  became  known  to  the  men  of  the  Fifth  Division  as  "Bloody  Gorge." 


-  13  - 


way  nearly  up  to  the  rim  of  the  gorge.  On  the  right,  CT  27  advanced  200  yards,  storming 
cave  after  cave  as  it  went. 

By  now,  the  Jap  defenders  were  being  steadily  compressed  into  a  smaller  and  smaller 
portion  of  the  northern  tip  of  the  island.  As  a  result,  their  nightly  efforts  to  break  through 
the  Division's  lines  grew  stronger  and  more  frequent.  On  the  night  of  D  plus  20-21  a 
concentration  of  Japs  forming  up  for  a  counterattack  was  smashed  by  Marine  artillery 
fire,  and  numerous  attempts  at  infiltration  were  also  dealt  with.  Another  outcome  of  this 
shrinking  of  the  territory  held  by  the  enemy  had  become  apparent  by  D  plus  21.  "There 
was  no  shortage  of  enemy  manpower,  weapons,  or  ammunition  in  the  area  the  Japs  had 
remaining  for  defense;  the  enemy  was  definitely  crowding  our  lines  and  maintaining  close 
contact  at  all  points  in  order  to  minimize  or  escape  our  air  and  artillery  fire."*  Never- 
theless, air  strikes  were  called  for  in  an  attempt  to  knock  out  some  of  the  concrete  block- 
houses in  the  Fifth  Division's  zone. 

It  was  clear  that  the  Division  was  now  up  against  the  enemy's  final  defensive  line. 
CT  28  on  the  left  flank  had  reached  the  edge  of  the  gorge.  Any  attempt  to  move  forward 
here  ran  into  a  stonewall  defense  and  brought  deadly  fire  from  every  side.  It  was  decided, 
therefore,  to  make  the  main  effort  of  the  Division  on  the  right  flank  where  the  terrain 
corridors  could  be  utilized  to  envelop  the  southern  (left)  flank  of  the  enemy  in  the  gorge 
and  to  surround  his  remaining  forces.  Accordingly,  CT  27  on  the  right  began  a  tank-led 
assault  on  D  plus  21  (March  12).  It  advanced  slowly  fighting  for  every  inch  of  ground. 
It  was  the  same  the  next  day.  In  an  effort  to  knock  out  some  of  the  stubborn  Jap  positions, 
7.2  inch  rockets  on  launchers  were  pulled  up  to  the  front  lines  by  armored  tractors  and 
fired.  Then  flame  thrower  tanks  worked  over  the  enemy  emplacements,  burning  them  out 
one  by  one.** 

The  final  drive  to  break  the  enemy's  line  was  launched  on  D  plus  23  (March  14).  CT  26 
was  committed  in  the  center  of  the  Division's  zone.  An  air  strike  was  used  to  burn  out 
one  strongpoint  with  a  huge  blazing  fire.  The  terrific  presure  on  the  Japs  began  to  tell 
now.  The  daily  pounding  they  had  taken  was  too  much  to  bear;  their  line  had  to  give, 
and  it  did.  CT  27  broke  through  on  the  right  for  a  gain  of  600  yards.  (See  map.)  A  total 
of  8789  Japs  had  now  been  killed  by  the  Fifth  Division,  while  35  had  been  taken  prisoner. 
However,  CT  27  reported  that  its  "men  were  exhausted  and  badly  in  need  of  rest,"  and 
the  Division's  casualties  had  jumped  to  7792. 

In  spite  of  their  reduced  strength  and  overwhelming  weariness,  the  three  regiments 
repulsed  the  usual  nightly  infiltration  attempts  and  moved  out  in  the  attack  again  the 
next  morning  (D  plus  24).  The  enemy  had  no  heavy  caliber  artillery  left  to  him  now,  but 
the  terrain  was  ideal  for  his  defensive  tactics,  and  every  position  was  fanatically  defended 
with  intense  small  arms  fire  delivered  at  point  blank  range.  CT  26  and  CT  27  made  only 
small  gains  during  the  day,  but  the  encirclement  of  the  enemy  was  now  well  under  way: 
the  final  Jap  pocket  had  begun  to  take  shape.  (See  map.) 

CT  27  was  completely  worn  out  by  this  time,  and  on  D  plus  25  (March  16)  it  reverted 
to  Division  Reserve.  Simultaneously,  the  boundary  line  between  the  Third  and  Fifth 
Divisions  was  changed,  and  the  27th's  zone  of  action  was  taken  over  by  units  of  the  Third 
Division.  CT  26  (with  LT  3/28  attached)  continued  the  Fifth  Division's  drive  to  squeeze  the 
Japs  into  one  small  pocket.  From  its  positions  along  the  southwest  rim  of  the  gorge,  CT  28 
supported  the  advance  of  the  26th  Marines  by  fire.  At  the  end  of  the  day  the  Third  Division 

*  Fifth  Division  War  Diary  for  March,  1945. 

*  *  Speaking  of  these  flame  thrower  tanks,  the  Fifth  Division  Action  Report  says :  "This  was  the  one  weapon 
that  caused  the  Japs  to  leave  their  caves  and  rock  crevices  and  run." 


-  14  - 


on  the  right  had  reached  the  northern  tip  of  the  island,  and  the  Fifth  Division  was  nearly 
there.  (See  map.)  The  last  die-hard  Japs  were  surrounded.  At  1800  that  day  of  March  16, 
the  Commanding  General,  V  Amphibious  Corps,  declared  that  organized  resistance  had 
ceased.  After  26  days  and  nights  of  the  bitterest  kind  of  fighting,  Iwo  was  pronounced 
"secure,"  except  for  one  minor  area  holding  out  at  the  north  end. 

This  exception  loomed  rather  large  in  the  eyes  of  the  men  of  the  Fifth  Division.  The 
pocket  was  little,  but  it  was  also  deadly.  On  D  plus  25  when  the  announcement  was  made 
that  organized  resistance  had  ended,  the  Fifth  Division's  combat  efficiency  had  fallen  to 
30%.  It  had  lost  8162  officers  and  men,  and  it  had  accounted  for  9512  Jap  dead  and  taken 
42  prisoners. 

The  reduction  of  the  enemy's  final  position  was  begun  on  D  plus  26  (March  17)  by 
CT  26  and  CT  28.  An  unsuccessful  effort  was  made  to  persuade  Colonel  Ikeda  to  surrender 
his  troops  in  the  pocket,  and  then  CT  26  started  its  attack.  By  1232  LT  1/26  had  reached 
the  ocean  at  Kitano  Point,  so  the  26th  swung  around  to  continue  its  advance  in  a  south- 
westerly direction.  Now  it  was  closing  in  on  the  rear  of  the  Japs  in  the  gorge  who  had 
been  holding  up  CT  28.  (See  map.)  By  the  end  of  the  day,  the  two  regiments  were  facing 
each  other  across  the  gorge,  and  the  remainder  of  the  Japs  were  trapped  between  them. 
With  the  fighting  reduced  to  such  a  small  area,  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  use  any 
artillery  fire  in  support,  so  the  13th  Marines  was  secured  and  given  its  reembarkation 
orders. 

The  situation  confronting  the  assault  battalions  now  is  best  described  in  the  words 
of  the  Division's  official  report: 

"The  Japs  were  now  cornered  in  a  pocket  of  resistance  approximately  200-500  yards 
wide  and  700  yards  long.  This  was  a  rocky  gorge  for  the  most  part  with  precipitous  sides. 
Scattered  through  this  gorge  there  was  a  series  of  jagged  rocky  outcrops  which  were  in 
effect  minor  gorges  and  constituted  major  obstacles  to  all  types  of  movement  and  were 
ideally  suited  to  the  enemy  type  of  defense.  All  suitable  routes  into  the  main  gorge  were 
swept  by  heavy  and  accurate  fire  from  machine  guns  and  rifles  coming  from  cave  positions 
in  the  cliffs  and  in  the  outcrops. 

"The  Japs  chose  to  defend  to  the  last  in  this  area  without  making  any  last  futile 
attacks.  Enemy  defenses  in  this  area  were  built  around  their  strongly  manned  cave  posi- 
tions many  of  which  were  interconnected  by  subterranean  passages.  They  gave  no  ground 
and  used  their  remaining  weapons  to  full  advantage.  Because  of  the  size  of  the  pocket 
and  the  very  broken  nature  of  the  ground,  supporting  fire  of  our  artillery  could  not  be 
used  and  tank  support  was  extremely  difficult.  It  was  necessary  to  use  tank  dozers  and 
armored  TD-14's  and  TD-18's*  to  construct  routes  of  approach  for  the  tanks  before  they 
could  be  brought  into  supporting  positions. 

"Our  own  losses  at  this  time  had  been  extremely  heavy.  The  average  battalion  which 
landed  with  36  officers  and  885  enlisted,  now  had  about  16  officers  and  300  enlisted  from 
the  original  battalion.  Most  of  the  company  commanders,  platoon  leaders,  and  squad 
leaders  had  become  casualties  and  many  platoons  were  commanded  by  Corporals  or  PFC's. 
Assault  squads  were  depleted. 

"Since  the  division  had  been  in  the  line  since  D-day  and  it  had  been  practically  im- 
possible to  rest  the  troops,  they  were  extremely  tired.  In  most  cases,  the  battalions  out  of 
the  line  had  to  be  held  in  local  reserve  in  a  position  of  readiness.  During  these  brief  periods 
when  they  were  not  actually  engaged,  these  battalions  found  it  necessary  to  hold  schools 
*  Author's  note :  These  were  types  of  heavy  tractors  used  for  bulldozing. 


-  15  - 


to  fit  the  replacements  into  their  units  and  to  give  them  instructions  as  the  majority  of 
them  were  not  prepared  for  the  type  of  fighting  employed  in  this  operation. 

"The  plan  for  attacking  the  gorge  called  for  one  regiment  to  hold  the  southern  rim 
along  the  steep  vertical  cliff  while  another  regiment  worked  in  from  the  north  and  east. 
Because  of  the  strength  of  the  units  and  the  condition  of  the  troops,  assigned  zones  of 
action  were  relatively  narrow. 

"The  battle  was  one  of  attrition  against  enemy  positions.  Our  advance  into  the  east 
end  of  the  gorge  was  measured  in  yards  as  each  cave  had  to  be  sealed  off  before  our  troops 
could  advance  and  this  was  slow.  Flame  throwing  tanks  were  used  extensively.  Each 
night  small  enemy  groups  attempted  to  infiltrate  our  lines  and  were  successful  on  several 
occasions  in  reaching  company  CP  areas  where  they  were  killed  without  inflicting  much 
damage." 

By  D  plus  28  (March  19),  Jap  resistance  had  become  centered  around  a  huge  concrete 
blockhouse  dug  into  the  side  of  a  knoll  in  the  gorge.  (See  map.)  This  structure  was 
covered  by  fire  from  every  direction,  and  when  the  Marines  finally  did  work  their  way 
up  to  it,  they  found  that  40  pound  shaped  charges  and  tank  fire  had  practically  no  effect 
on  it.  It  was  decided,  therefore,  to  knock  out  the  surrounding  cave  positions  that  guarded 
the  approaches  to  the  blockhouse.  In  terrain  as  broken  and  rough  as  it  was  in  "Bloody 
Gorge,"  it  was  necessary  to  attack  caves  such  as  these  one  by  one.  First  an  armored  bull- 
dozer would  cut  a  route  of  approach,  then  a  flame  thrower  tank  would  saturate  the  cave 
entrance  with  fire,  and  finally  an  assault  squad  would  blow  the  mouth  shut  with  demo- 
lition charges. 

When  the  Jap  defenses  surrounding  the  blockhouse  had  been  knocked  out  in  this  way, 
the  position  was  by-passed.  This  same  day  of  D  plus  28,  LT  3/27  worked  its  way  into  the 
southeastern  end  of  the  gorge  and  began  to  push  slowly  toward  the  sea.  (The  rest  of 
CT  27  remained  in  Division  Reserve.)  On  the  following  day,  when  renewed  attacks  on  the 
blockhouse  with  shaped  charges  and  point  blank  fire  produced  no  results,  tank  dozers 
were  brought  up  and  they  closed  off  some  of  its  air  vents  and  a  door  on  the  north  side.* 

Throughout  this  period,  enemy  resistance  continued  bitter.  Many  Japs  were  armed 
with  M-l  rifles  and  were  fighting  in  Marine  uniforms  now.  Few  of  them  could  be  seen, 
but  their  fire  was  deadly  accurate  at  the  close  ranges  that  characterized  all  fighting  in 
the  gorge.  Marine  tanks  could  not  be  brought  into  action  much  of  the  time  because  of 
the  impassable  ground.  If  a  route  of  approach  for  them  was  bulldozed,  the  enemy  would 
often  infiltrate  and  plant  mines  along  it  during  the  night. 

Behind  the  lines,  mopping  up  of  snipers  was  continuing.  On  D  plus  30  (March  21) 
the  Fifth  Division  Cemetery  was  dedicated  by  General  Rockey  at  a  memorial  service.  At 
the  beaches  the  13th  Marines  had  reembarked  by  now,  and  CT  27  was  in  the  process  of 
loading  aboard  its  ships. 

Meanwhile,  CT  26  (with  LT  3/28  and  LT  3/27  attached)  was  attacking  down  the 
length  of  the  gorge  toward  the  sea,  while  CT  28  continued  to  hold  its  position  along  the 
southwest  rim,  where  the  main  enemy  resistance  was  now  centered  (D  plus  31,  March  22). 

The  attack  was  continued  the  next  day  by  CT  26  and  CT  28,  and  in  the  late  afternoon 
the  enemy's  organized  resistance  seemed  to  be  breaking.  The  pocket  had  been  reduced 
by  now  to  a  triangular  area  extending  200  yards  along  the  beach  and  250  yards  inland. 

*  This  blockhouse  was  completely  destroyed  later  only  when  5  separate  charges  of  high  explosive,  totaling 
8500  pounds,  were  set  off  on  it. 


-  16  - 


Since  it  was  obvious  that  the  fighting  was  nearly  over  at  last,  most  of  CT  26  was 
withdrawn  from  action  and  moved  to  the  beaches  on  D  plus  33  (March  24)  to  begin 
reembarkation.  The  27th  Marines  had  finished  loading  the  day  before.  At  the  northern 
tip  of  Iwo  CT  28,  with  LT  3/26  attached,  was  pounding  the  final  pocket  in  a  drive  to  finish 
off  the  remaining  Jap  defenders.  By  1800  only  one  small  area  50  yards  square  remained 
to  be  taken. 

On  D  plus  34  (March  25),  the  final  drive  to  the  sea  was  begun  by  LT  3/28  and  LT  2/28. 
At  1045  they  reached  the  beach.  The  pocked  had  been  eliminated,  and  the  long  battle  was 
over. 

However,  one  last  flare-up  of  resistance  occurred  early  the  next  morning  (D  plus  35). 
Approximately  250  Japs  suddenly  launched  a  surprise  attack  in  the  area  west  of  Airfield 
No.  2.  The  5th  Pioneer  Battalion  happened  to  be  directly  in  the  path  of  the  enemy,  and 
it  bore  the  brunt  of  the  attack  (although  several  Army  and  Navy  units  were  also  engaged). 
By  0830  the  Jap  force  had  been  annihilated,  with  196  dead  counted  in  the  Pioneer's  zone. 

That  was  the  last  action  of  the  Fifth  Marine  Division  on  Iwo  Jima.  At  0800,  March  26, 
after  36  days  of  continuous  combat,  it  turned  over  its  zone  to  the  Third  Division,  and 
then  CT  28  and  LT  3/26  proceeded  aboard  ship.  The  following  day,  D  plus  36,  the  Division 
completed  its  reembarkation  and  departed  from  Iwo  Jima,  bound  once  more  for  Hawaii.* 

The  bitter  struggle  for  Iwo  had  been  a  costly  one  for  the  Fifth  Division.  The  campaign 
had  taken  a  toll  of  8719  officers  and  men.  Of  these,  2482  had  been  killed  in  action  or  died 
of  their  wounds.**  But  the  Division  had  done  an  outstanding  job  in  its  first  battle.  It  had 
captured  over  half  of  Iwo,  including  the  vital  objective  of  Mt.  Suribachi.  It  had  killed 
11,314  Japs  and  taken  62  prisoners.  The  small  number  of  prisoners  was  a  good  indication 
of  the  fierceness  of  the  fighting  and  the  bitterness  of  the  enemy's  defense.  The  Command- 
ing General,  V  Amphibious  Corps,  commented:  "The  Fifth  Marine  Division  carried  the 
attack  to  the  enemy  with  determination  and  effectiveness  throughout  the  Iwo  Jima 
operation  in  spite  of  heavy  casualties  in  its  infantry  units." 

The  price  had  been  high,  but  the  island  was  worth  it.  From  the  airfields  that  had 
been  won  by  the  heroism  and  sacrifices  of  the  men  of  the  Third,  Fourth  and  Fifth  Marine 
Divisions,  American  fighter  planes  would  soon  be  taking  off  for  Tokyo.  Crippled  B-29's 
returning  from  Japan  would  have  a  friendly  base  on  which  to  land.  The  Fifth  Marine 
Division  had  done  much  to  make  this  possible. 

*  For  an  illustration  of  the  feelings  of  the  people  of  Hawaii  about  the  return  of  the  5th  Division,  see 
Appendix  "E". 

**A  letter  from  General  Rockey  to  the  Commandant  on  7  June,  1945,  gives  the  following  breakdown  of 
the  casualties: 

KIA  &  DOW  WIA  MIA  Total 

Off.  Enl.  Off.  Enl.  Off.  Enl.  Off.  Enl. 

104  2378  250  5968  2  17  356  8363 

Of  the  battle  casualties,  70%  occurred  in  the  infantry  regiments  (including  their  replacements).  Some  of 
the  rifle  battalions  suffered  losses  of  over  100%. 


-  17  - 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  "A" 

Command  and  Staff  Personnel 


NAME 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  A.  Bourke 
Maj.  Gen.  Keller  E.  Rockey 
Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  A.  Bourke 


ASSUMED 
COMMAND 


RELINQUISHED 
COMMAND 


Commanding  Generals 
21  Jan  44  3  Feb  44 

4  Feb  44  24  Jun  45 

25  Jun  45 


Assistant  Division  Commanders 


Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  A.  Bourke  4  Feb  44 
Brig.  Gen.  Leo.  D.  Hermle  24  Apr  44 

Brig.  Gen.  Ray  A.  Robinson  16  Jun  45 

The  Division  Staff: 


Col.  William  A.  Worton 

7  Feb 

44 

18 

Lt.  Col.  James  F.  Shaw,  Jr. 

18  Sep 

44 

10 

Col.  Ray  A.  Robinson 

10  Oct 

44 

15 

Col.  Benjamin  W.  Gaily 

16  Jun 

45 

4 

Col.  Clarence  R.  Wallace 

5  Jul 

45 

D-l 

Maj.  Lawrence  A.  Theodore 

4  Jan 

44 

5 

Col.  Lee  H.  Brown 

5  Feb 

44 

11 

Maj.  Lawrence  A.  Theodore 

11  Sep 

44 

18 

Col.  John  W.  Beckett 

18  Oct 

44 

25 

Lt.  Col.  Warner  T.  Bigger 

25  Jun 

45 

D-2 

Lt.  Col.  George  A.  Roll 

6  Jan 

44 

D-3 

Lt.  Col.  James  F.  Shaw,  Jr. 

4  Jan 

44 

15 

Lt.  Col.  Frederick  R.  Dowsett 

15  May 

45 

D-4 

Col.  Randolph  McC.  Pate 

1  Jan 

44 

10 

Lt.  Col.  Earl  S.  Piper 

10  Sep 

44 

1 

Lt.  Col.  Frederick  A.  Stevens 

2  Jul 

45 

11  Apr  44 
15  Jun  45 

Chief  of  Staff 


Jul  45 


Feb  44 


Col.  James  D.  Waller 


Lt.  Col.  Clifford  H.  Shuey 
Col.  Benjamin  W.  Gaily 

Lt.  Col.  Chester  B.  Graham 

Col.  Thomas  A.  Wornham 

Lt.  Col.  Chandler  W.  Johnson 
Lt.  Col.  Charles  E.  Shepard 
Col.  Harry  B.  Liversedge 


15  May  45 


Jul  45 


Regimental  Commanders:    13th  Marines 
10  Jan  44 

16th  Marines 
15  Dec  43  17  Feb  44 

18  Feb  44  25  May  44 

26  th  Marines 
10  Jan  44 

27  th  Marines 

10  Jan  44 

28th  Marines 
8  Feb  44  10  Feb  44 

11  Feb  44  11  Feb  44 
11  Feb  44 


NEW  ASSIGNMENT 

Asst.  Div.  Comdr. 
Ill  Phib  Corps 


V  Phib  Corps 
CINCPOA 


3rd  Mar.  Div. 
D-3 

Asst.  Div.  Comdr. 
Ill  Phib  Corps 


Div.  Adjutant 
HQ,  FMF,  Pac 
Div.  Adjutant 
HQ,  FMF,  Pac 


2nd  Mar.  Div. 


HQ,  FMF,  Pac 
III  Phib  Corps 


Exec.  Officer 
5th  Service  Bn. 


CO,  2nd  Bn. 
CO,  3rd  Bn. 


Notes:  (1)  In  March  1945,  the  designating  letter  for  a  division  staff  officer  was  changed  from  "D"  to  "G." 

(2)  For  some  time,  the  Fifth  Division's  staff  planning  officer  was  called  the  "D-5." 
Sources:    (1)  Fifth  Division  Muster  Rolls. 

(2)  Fifth  Division  War  Diaries. 

(3)  Headquarters  Memorandums. 


-  21A  - 


APPENDIX  "B" 


(1)  ACTIVATION  OF  THE  DIVISION'S  UNIT:* 

a.  Camp  Lejeune: 

16th  Marines  (minus  2nd  Battalion)    28  January  1944 

5th  Medical  Bn  (minus  H&S  Co,  A  Co)    28  January  1944 

2nd  Battalion,  13th  Marines    16  October  1943 

Co  B,  Co  C,  5th  Motor  Transport  Bn   19  January  1944 

b.  San  Diego  Area: 

Headquarters  Battalion   1  December  1943 

5th  Tank  Battalion  (minus  Company  D)    3  January  1944 

5th  Service  Battalion   7  February  1944 

5th  Motor  Transport  Bn  (minus  Co  B,  Co  C)    1  February  1944 

H&S  Co  and  Co  A,  5th  Medical  Bn  1  &  6  February  1944 

13th  Marines  (minus  2nd  Battalion)    10  January  1944 

2nd  Battalion,  16th  Marines   8  February  1944 

26th  Marines   10  January  1944 

27th  Marines   10  January  1944 

28th  Marines 


c.  The  Fifth  Division  was  activated  on  21  January  1944.**  (Although  Headquarters 
Battalion  was  organized  on  1  December  1943.) 

d.  On  25  May  1944  the  16th  Marines  was  disbanded,  and  that  same  day  the  5th 
Engineer  Bn  and  5th  Pioneer  Bn  were  activated. 

(2)  COMPONENT  UNITS  (as  of  August  1945): 

Headquarters  Battalion  including  5th  Assault  Signal  Company 

5th  Service  Battalion 

5th  Medical  Battalion 

5th  Motor  Transport  Battalion 

5th  Amphibian  Truck  Company 

5th  Tank  Battalion 

116th  Naval  Construction  Battalion 

5th  Pioneer  Battalion 

5th  Engineer  Battalion 

13th  Marines 

26th  Marines 

27th  Marines 

28th  Marines 

Temporarily  Attached: 

6th  Laundry  Platoon 

3rd  Provisional  Rocket  Detachment 

*  This  data  is  taken  from  a  letter  written  by  the  Commandant  to  the  Commanding  General,  Camp  Lejeune, 
and  the  Commanding  General,  PMF,  San  Diego  Area,  on  20  January  1944. 

**  Letter  from  the  Commanding  General,  5th  MarDiv  to  the  Commandant  on  1  February  1944. 


-  22B  - 


APPENDIX  "C" 


TASK  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  5TH  MARINE  DIVISION 

AT  IWO  JIMA 

1.  CT-27  (Col.  WORNHAM) 

27th  Marines 

B  Co,  5th  Engr  Bn  (less  Dets) 

5th  Tk  Bn  (less  C  Co) 

B  Co,  5th  Med  Bn 

2nd  Plat,  5th  MP  Co 

1st  Sec,  6th  Mar  War  Dog  Plat 

Det  5th  JASCO 

Det  3rd  Prov  Rocket  Det 

2.  CT-28  (less  LT-328)  (Col.  LIVERSEDGE) 

28th  Marines  (less  3rd  Bn) 

C  Co,  5th  Engr  Bn  (less  3rd  Plat  and  Dets) 

C  Co,  5th  Tk  Bn 

C  Co,  5th  Med  Bn 

2nd  Plat,  5th  MP  Co 

2nd  Sec,  6th  Mar  War  Dog  Plat 

Det  5th  JASCO 

Det  3rd  Prov  Rocket  Det 


3.  ARTILLERY  GROUP  (Col.  WALLER) 

13th  Marines 

5th  Marine  Amphib  Truck  Co 
471st  Amphib  Truck  Co 
VMO-5 

4.  ARMORED  AMPHD3IAN  GROUP  (Maj.  BEVANS) 

C  and  D  Co's,  2nd  Armd  Amphib  Bn 
Hq  Det,  2nd  Armd  Amphib  Bn 

5.  AMPHIBIAN  TRACTOR  GROUP  (LtCol.  STEFAN) 

3rd  Amphib  Trac  Bn 
11th  Amphib  Trac  Bn 

6.  SUPPORT  GROUP  (Maj.  AYRAULT) 

5th  Hq  Co 
5th  Sig  Co 
5th  Reconn  Co 

5th  MP  Co  (less  1st,  2nd,  3rd,  4th,  and  5th  Plats) 
Det  Sig  Bn,  V  Phib  Corps 
JICPOA  Int  Team 


-  23C  - 


APPENDIX  "C"  (Cont'd) 

6th  Mar  War  Dog  Plat  (less  1st  and  2nd  Sees) 
5th  JASCO  (less  Dets) 
Det  726th  SAW  Co 

7.  5TH  SHORE  PARTY  REGIMENT  (Col.  GALLY) 

5th  Pion  Bn 

31st  NCB 

Det  5th  Engr  Bn 

Div  Band 

592nd  Port  Co 

Det  8th  Field  Depot 

Det  5th  MT  Bn 

Det  5th  Serv  Bn 

Det  5th  JASCO 

4th  and  5th  Plats,  5th  MP  Co 

27th  Replacement  Bn 

31st  Replacement  Bn 

8.  SERVICE  GROUP  (LtCol.  SHUEY) 

H&S  Co,  5th  Engr  Bn  (less  Dets) 
5th  Med  Bn  (less  A,  B,  and  C  Co's) 
5th  MT  Bn  (less  Dets) 
5th  Serv  Bn  (less  Dets) 

9.  DIVISION  RESERVE 

LT-328:  (LtCol.  SHEPARD) 

3rd  Bn,  28th  Marines 
3rd  Plat,  C  Co,  5th  Engr  Bn 
Det  5th  JASCO 

LT-126:  (LtCol.  POLLOCK) 

1st  Bn,  26th  Marines 
1st  Plat,  C  Co,  5th  Engr  Bn 
Det  5th  JASCO 

SUMMARY  OF  ATTACHED  UNITS  REINFORCING  THE  DIVISION 

a.  2nd  Armd  Amph  Bn  (less  Dets) 

b.  3rd  Amph  Trac  Bn 

c.  11th  Amph  Trac  Bn 

d.  5th  JASCO 

e.  VMO-5 

f.  6th  Mar  War  Dog  Plat 

g.  31st  NCB 

h.  6th  Sec,  726th  SAW  Co  (Army) 

i.  471st  Amph  Truck  Co  (Army) 
j.  592nd  Port  Co  (Army) 

k.  Det,  Sig  Bn,  VAC 

1.  3rd  Plat,  2nd  Laundry  Co 


-  24C  - 


APPENDIX  "D" 


1944 


31  January    5,446 

29  February    9,478 

31  March    17,275 

30  April    17,177 

31  May    17,573 

30  June    18,187 

31  July    12,817 

31  August    18,637 

30  September    17,125 

31  October    17,349 


30  November    17,278 

31  December    17,267 

1945 

31  January    17,214 

28  February    17,201 

31  March    14,478 

30  April   15,702 

31  May    17,499 

30  June    17,268 

31  July    17,066 

31  August    17,681 


Note:   On  31  July  1944,  the  5th  Division  was  split  into  an  Advance  Echelon  and  a  Rear  Echelon. 
Sources:  (1)  Monthly  Strength  Reports  of  5th  Marine  Division. 
(2)  War  Diaries  of  5th  Marine  Division. 


-  25D 


APPENDIX  "E 


The  following  resolution  was  adopted  by  the  Senate  of  the  Legislature  of  the  Territory 
of  Hawaii  on  20  April  1945 : 

"WHEREAS,  in  the  long  and  glorious  history  of  the  United  States  Marine 
Corps  one  epic  scene  of  valor  succeeds  another;  and 

WHEREAS,  in  all  that  glorious  history,  the  Marines  have  never  fought  with 
greater  valor  or  contempt  for  their  own  lives  and  safety  than  in  the  conquest  of 
Iwo  Jima;  and 

WHEREAS,  not  merely  their  fabulous  courage  and  fortitude,  but  the  immense 
importance  of  their  conquest  to  the  speedy  victory  over  the  enemy,  commands  the 
respect  and  gratitude  of  the  American  people;  and 

WHEREAS,  the  Fifth  Division  of  the  United  States  Marine  Corps  are  old 
friends  of  the  people  of  the  Territory  and  particularly  of  the  island  of  Hawaii, 
and  have  now  returned  to  rest  and  recuperate  on  Hawaii;  now  therefore 

BE  IT  RESOLVED  by  the  Senate  of  the  Twenty-Third  Session  of  the  Legis- 
lature of  the  Territory  of  Hawaii  that  the  heartfelt  welcome  of  the  Senate  and  of 
the  people  of  Hawaii  be  extended  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Fifth  Division  of 
the  United  States  Marine  Corps  upon  their  return  to  the  island  of  Hawaii  after 
their  magnificent  part  in  the  conquest  of  Iwo  Jima;  and 

BE  IT  FURTHER  RESOLVED  that  copies  of  this  Resolution  be  sent  to  Major 
General  Keller  E.  Rockey,  the  commanding  officer  of  said  Fifth  Division,  to 
General  Alexander  A.  Vandegrift,  United  States  Marines  Corps,  to  Admiral  of 
the  Fleet  Chester  W.  Nimitz,  and  to  the  Honorable  Secretary  of  the  Navy." 


mcpb  129892  7-22-46  500 


-  26E  - 


-RED  M.  GRAY  MARINE  CORPS 
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D  769.37  5th  .C5 
Chap in,  John  C. 
The  Fifth  Marine  Division  in 
World  War  II. 


VE604    5  th    .A3C4  c.4 


ALFRED  M  aRINE  CORPS 

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